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Innovation and jobs
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are needed to see this picture.

Source: David Rotman (June 12, 2013), How technology is destroying jobs. MIT Technology Review.
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Innovation-driven change
Long-term productivity gains
•
•

During the transition?
Distribution?

Skill-biased technical change
•

CTIs only?

Modes of innovation
•

Forms economic integration

Creative Destruction
•

Political and Economic
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What is Bayh-Dole?
• Who owns patents from federally
funded research?
• Before: discretion of agency
• After: research contractors
• Universities

Patenting in the U.S.
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Patenting: Forecast 1980-2005
(with1963-1979 data)
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Bayh-Dole Regime (BDR)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Stevenson-Wydler 1980 (PL 96-480)
FTTA 1986 (PL 99-502)
CAFC 1982 (PL 98-462)
NCRA 1984 (PL 98-462)
Hatch-Waxman 1984 (PL 98-417)
Diamond v. Chakrabarty 1980 (447 U.S. 303)
Diamond v. Diehr 1981 (450 U.S. 175)
Reforms in Financial Sector (ERISA, 74)
Reforms in International Commerce (Special 301,
1994)

BDR Effects: Efficiency
• Quality of patents
• Crowding-out basic research
• Republic of science
– Tragedy of anti-commons
– Research tools

• Perverse incentives
– Cultural change?

BDR Effects: Tradition
• Ideal type science: Mertonian norms.
• Ideal type university = traditional type
– Public disclosure of research
– Faculty defined research agenda
– Impartiality of research (peer review)

• New values

– Secrecy
– Donor defined agenda
– Conflicts of interest

The role of the university
Richard Levin (American Council of Education March 6, 2011)

• “Congress did not intend to give us the
right to maximize profits”
• “…it gave us private-property rights for a
public purpose: to ensure that the
benefits of research are widely shared.”

BDR Effects: What is missing?
•
•

How are the benefits of innovation
distributed?
Are there distributional outcomes in
T2?
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Nexus: innovation-distribution
• Asymmetries of inputs tend to
reproduce in outputs.
• Entrepreneurship
– Creative destruction.
– Small businesses

• Industrial Organization of high-tech
sectors.

Modes of innovation
• Are there asymmetries in university tech
transfer?
• Is tech transfer a catalyst of
entrepreneurship?
– inadvertently strengthening incumbents
market power?

• Are high-tech industries concentrated or
competitive?

OTTs: Org-isomorphism

Distribution of Licensing Income

Research Funds & Licensing Income

Research Funds & Licensing Income

Asymmetries
Distribution of licensing income
• Of 218 OTTs, 132 at a loss
• Stable top 40 earners
• Input-output asymmetries

Why stay in T2 business?
– Not current but expected revenues
– Internal: Manage existing IP portfolio. Train
faculty.
– External: Partner in economic development
– Public mission: profit motive in check with other
values

Research is not a lottery
• Re-balance research portfolio
• Cultivate entrepreneurial spirit in campus
• Organizational incentives
Also…
• New T2 business model

New T2 models
• Socially responsible licensing
• “Nurturing” start-ups
– Legal: IP portfolio
– Incubator services
– Experience in negotiation
– Networking (investors, suppliers)

A new OTT model
Pros
• Easier than selling
licenses
• Higher deferred
income
• Prestige: fostering
entrepreneurship

Cons
• Hard to sell
lackluster start-ups
• Early large negative
cash-flow
• Univ. going out of
traditional roles

Lessons from history
• Venture Capital: evidence from survey
data (Gans, Hsu, Stern, 2000)
• Biotechnology
• Creative destruction
– Baumol: “Why Computers Get Cheaper
and Health Care Doesn't”
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Three levels
• University
• Federal Agency
• Congress: changes to the statute

Universities
• Explain role of university beyond
“economic rationalization”
– Education:

• Labor force but also consumers.
• Civic education.

– Public mission not-for-profit character
– Equal opportunity (social mobility)

Universities
• Emphasis on best practices (9 points)
• Socially responsible licensing programs
• Preference for non-exclusive licenses

– Research tools, humanitarian, environmental.
– Multi-site research and commercialization
– Patent Pools

• Nurturing start-ups: Longer horizon for
investments

Policy: Federal Agencies
• Declare preference for non-exclusive
licenses from their research grants
• Invite grantees to voluntarily opt-out
from aggressive licensing practices
– E.g. Reach-through fees

• More multi-site research grants
• Sponsor patent-pools

Policy: Congress
• Reaffirm the role of the university as brokeragent
• Create incentives for university cooperation
• Relax “exceptional circumstances” (35 U.S.C.
§202-a-ii)
– For agencies to limit or cancel rights to inventions

• Expand powers for “marching-rights” (35
U.S.C. §203)
– To control of monopolistic prices

